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Inspection of Orion at ISS
• Orion-inspection research by ISAG took place from 2008 through 2011*.
– Work relevant to ISS Visiting Vehicle inspection continues.
– Work relevant to Orion inspection for non-ISS missions continues.
• Original assumptions (2008-2011), involving hardware
– Vehicle would be docked at Node 2 Forward, or Node 2 Zenith for 210 days
– Inspection would occur 7 days before undocking
– Inspection, based on Space Shuttle heritage, would consist of
• Full-surface, primarily robotic, imagery “survey” to detect damage suspects.  Includes coverage verification.
• Followed by, if needed, focused inspection to determine nature and criticality of any damage detected
• Thermal Protection System (TPS) Inspection planning research (2008-2011)
– Driven by estimated risk of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission associated with critical TPS 
damage.
• Critical TPS damage leading to catastrophic spacecraft reentry represented one of the largest estimated risks 
for Orion missions.
– Guided by TPS failure criteria (next slide).
– Imaging and associated robotic resources already on the ISS evaluated.
– Imaging resources already space qualified (e.g. for the Space Shuttle) evaluated (e.g. Laser 
Camera System [LCS], Laser Dynamic Range Imager [LDRI]).
– Imaging and sensing resources at various technology readiness levels (TRLs) reviewed.
– TPS addressed by ISAG effort mainly consisted of the tiles on the Back Shell and Forward 
Bay Cover (FBC) of the Crew Module (CM).
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*In 2010, the Constellation Program, which planned frequent Orion “Crew Exploration Vehicle” access to the ISS, 
was canceled.  The Orion spacecraft development was continued, but principally directed at non-LEO exploration.
ISS
Orion
CEV
Inspection Assumptions and Strategy
• Thermal Protection System (TPS) Failure Criteria (to be addressed by 
inspection)
– Allowable depth of tile penetration (specific values, depending on location)
• Tile damage main cavity, generally observable by line-of-sight imager (sometimes with difficulty).
• Deeper damage cavity protrusions, called “fingers”, more difficult to view, but often not a concern, 
depending on geometry.
– Allowable area (specific value, relevant during the study) of Strain Isolation Pad 
(SIP) penetration. The SIP is immediately under the tile.
• SIP penetration area somewhat observable by a line-of-sight imager.
– Allowable degree of core buckling (currently zero core buckling allowed).
• Not directly observable, in general, by a line-of-sight imager.
• Appeared, from X-ray/CT imagery, to be reasonably correlated with SIP penetration area exceedance.
• Derived Survey Inspection Criteria
– Must detect 0.25”-diameter entry hole.  Entry holes smaller than that were not 
believed to be associated with any of the TPS failure criteria.
• Based on testing and modeling.
– A 0.25”-diameter entry hole was estimated to be over 50% likely, on the average, 
for a 210-day ISS-docked mission.
3
Summary of Lessons Learned and 
Recommendations
• Survey Inspection
– High probability (>99%) of detection of critical damage likely with existing robotic 
ISS assets.  
• Full robotic-based surface coverage is anticipated.
• High probability detection may require redundant, independent screening.
– White painted tile superior to black tile for MMOD damage detection
– Line-of-sight illumination preferable 
• Causes core material to “glow” through entry hole
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Summary of Lessons Learned and 
Recommendations (continued)
• Focused Inspection
– Marginal focused inspection capability with existing robotic ISS assets
• Poor depth measurement resolution could lead to unnecessary scrapping of vehicle (a “loss-of-
mission” outcome) for a damage cavity that might otherwise be cleared for safe reentry with better 
sensory data.
– Inherent 3D sensor recommended 
• Superior to stereo from 2D when an internal surface is featureless, and when the entry hole is too 
small for good parallax)
– High-resolution, color robotic imaging capability recommended
• The OTVC camera (later slides), which exists on-board and is capable of close viewing, is grey scale.
– UV illuminator recommended 
• At least one sub-surface material is fluorescent.
– Penetrating sensor recommended (e.g. back-scatter Xray), when compact, 
robotically deployable, space qualified technology is ready.
• Damage geometry may involve voids that cannot be seen line-of-sight through the entry hole.
• Even if damage geometry can technically be characterized through the entry hole, there may be a 
large number of viewing positions required, and the merging of data from those views into a single 3D 
model may be a challenge.
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What is the probability of detecting critical damage 
on Orion TPS, using sensors under consideration?
Can the sensors be placed in needed viewing 
positions?
Step 1:  Survey Inspection
6
Survey Inspection of the MPCV at 
Node 2 Forward
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Zenith 
sweep
Port 
sweep
Nadir 
sweep
Starboard 
sweep
Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) 
arm, based at the Node 2 Power/Data Grapple Fixture 
(PDGF) with Latching End Effector (LEE)-based MSS 
Camera inspecting the Crew Module
Here, the SSRMS end-effector camera, 
a Mobile Servicing System (MSS) type, 
is being used for the survey inspection.
Inspection of the MPCV at Node 2 Zenith
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With the SSRMS based on the Mobile Base System (MBS) platform, there 
is ample margin in reach for a TPS survey by the SSRMS cameras alone.  
Here, Dextre is also shown, attached to the end of the SSRMS.
End of the SSRMS and 
beginning of Dextre
Dextre
SSRMS
Here, the SSRMS has 
grappled Dextre, an ISS 
external robot which also has 
several MSS-type cameras.
The illuminators built near the 
MSS camera lines of sight 
have been more dependable 
on Dextre than on the 
SSRMS end effector.
Sample MSS Camera Imagery under 
Mock Solar Illumination, with 
Screener Annotations
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Example screener‐annotated slide from a damage detection blind study in the Fall of 2010.  The MSS images were captured 
under conditions equivalent to 10’ range at full zoom (7.7 mm focal length) and simulated sunlight or MSS artificial 
illumination.   The images were all subject to the degradation associated with the mockup ISS Video Baseband Signal Processor 
(VBSP)* which  discarded an entire field of information (and therefore half of the vertical resolution).    In 2013, the VBSP was 
replaced with newer technology with improved downlinked image quality.
MSS Camera PoD Blind Testing Results
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Test Cases (below) \Inputs 
and Estimated Probability of 
Detection (PoD) ‐ (Across)
Number 
of trials  
(given)
Number of 
successes 
(given)
Confidence 
Level 
(given)
Minimum PoD 
for 1 Screener 
(POD_1):  
Estimated 
Minimum Single‐
screener PoD  ‐  
(calculated)
Minimum POD 
for 2 
Independent 
Screeners or 
Teams POD_2 = (1 ‐ 
PF2), where PF2 = PF1 * 
PF1 (i.e. probability of 
both teams failing) and 
Minimum POD for 
3 Independent 
Screeners or 
Teams POD_3 = (1 ‐ 
PF3), where PF3 = PF1 * 
PF1 * PF1  (i.e. probability 
of all 3 teams failing) and 
PF1 = 1 ‐ POD_1
MSS Imagery Blind Testing, 
All Screeners, Off‐axis 
Illumination (Black Tiles 
Only, 0.24" ≤ Entry Hole ≤  
0.27") 84 83 0.95 0.93 0.995 0.9996
MSS Imagery Blind Testing, 
All Screeners, Distributed 
Illumination (Black Tiles 
Only, Including transplanted 
black regions of white tiles, 
0.24" ≤ Entry Hole ≤  0.28") 21 21 0.95 0.80 0.962 0.9925
MSS Imagery Blind Testing, 
All Screeners,  On‐axis 
Illumination (Black Tiles 
Only, 0.24" ≤ Entry Hole Size ≤ 
0.27") 36 36 0.95 0.90 0.989 0.9989
MSS Imagery Blind Testing, 
All Screeners,  All 
Illumination (White Tiles 
Only, 0.22" ≤ Entry Hole Size ≤ 
0.28") 108 106 0.95 0.93 0.996 0.9997
MSS camera based probability of detection (PoD) estimates (right three columns) based on 
screener testing in the Fall of 2010.  
Survey Illumination Examples and Issues
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SSRMS and Dextre MSS-type Imager with 
Relevant* Line-of-sight (LOS) Illumination
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Internal silica glows against entry hole rim, for both black and white (painted) tiles, given line-of-sight illumination.  This 
gives evidence that an actual entry hole is present, and the suspect feature is not missed or considered just a blemish.
White-painted tile without LOS illumination White-painted tile with LOS illumination
*Flight-similar illuminators were set up for this camera testing.
In 2010, white-
painted tiles were 
considered the 
most likely after the 
first Orion mission.
Problem:  For MSS-type imagers, 
operating in daylight, passing shadows 
can completely obscure damage
Day with high‐contrast “sun” shadow covering 
an entry hole (see right image for reference).
Day with high‐contrast  “sun” shadow 
another entry hole and nearly covering a 
third (see left image for reference).
Large impact is completely hidden by 
shadow in this image.
One impact is completely hidden and the other mostly 
hidden by shadow in left image
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Sample LDRI Imagery
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Sequences of "Level‐1" LDRI Images for which a simulation of hardware shadowing the "sun" is demonstrated.  Note that both tile impact features (the impact in the center and the impact 
adjacent to the serial numbers) remain clearly visible and detectable regardless of the progress of the shadow.
Example Hypervelocity‐impact Entry Holes and Annotations by Screeners in Blind/Subjective Detection Testing.  Note a small entry
hole (diameter 0.19”) in the upper‐left by the serial numbers that was not circled.  The larger entry hole in that image (the one that 
was circled) has a diameter of 0.27”.  The left and right images are of black tile cases and the center image shows a white tile.  All 
three images have an impact with a diameter on the order of 0.25”.
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Can FI sensors under consideration be used to 
help determine the criticality of damage?
Will the results be of adequate resolution, to avoid 
unnecessary loss-of-mission decisions?
Step 2:  Focused Inspection (FI)
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Basic Focused Inspection Imagery Approaches
• Deploy sensor robotically* for close, high-resolution viewing of a tile 
damage cavity of concern.
– *Crew space walks could also be considered, but are risky and time consuming.
• Produce 3D characterization of the damage cavity
– Use an inherently 3D sensor (e.g. LCS)
– Use a 2D imager (e.g. the OTVC**) from 2 or more viewpoints
• SSRMS grapples the external robot called Dextre, whose “arms” have OTVCs at their end points.
• An OTVC has two illuminators, is grayscale, and fixed focus, with an optimal focus distance of about 
16”
• The large number of robotic joints leading up to an OTVC allows many degrees of freedom for 
positioning and orientation.
• Each OTVC center is 2.5” from a roll axis, and the roll angle can be known very precisely.  Thus the 
eyepoint position movement due to such a roll can also be known very precisely, assuming the 
SSRMS and Dextre don’t otherwise move during such a roll.  Thus, an OTVC can be considered as a 
source of stereo or multiview imagery collection.
– Process the sensed data to generate 3D characterization.
• Give characterization results to Damage Assessment Team for 
dispositioning.
16**[[[Orbital replacement unit] Tool Change-out Mechanism] Television Camera]
TPS Damage Failure Criteria
• 1) Allowable depth of tile penetration (location dependent specific values)
• 2) Allowable area of Strain Isolation Pad (SIP) penetration (a specific value 
that was relevant during the study).  The SIP is immediately under the tile.
• 3) Allowable degree of core buckling (currently zero core buckling allowed).
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Does not fail criterion1 (or 2)
Fails both criteria 1 and 2
LCS* 3D Point Clouds:  Elevation Views
X-ray Elevation View**
(Fails
criterion
3 as well)
*The LCS flew on the Space Shuttle, but is not present on the ISS.
**Ground/lab capability (not on the ISS)
Damage Example:  Image of Tile Damage Showing Various 
Material Layers Down to the Top of the SIP (Red)
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Impact 7 single image, with image-analyst annotations obtained via stereo photogrammetry analysis 
of an image pair.  The bottom segment, indicated with the blue arrow, has an area of 17.7 sq mm or 
0.0274 sq. in.
Additional ISAG Inquiry:  Discernment of SIP from 
Tile Silica under 365 nm UV Illumination*
(No existing or currently planned ISS capability)
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The same view of SIP and silica under visible illumination (left) and UV illumination 
centered at 365 nm (right).  The UV illuminator did include some visible-band 
illumination, but the fluorescence of the SIP due to UV is distinct.
*Ground/lab capability, not ISS.
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Using One OTVC As a Virtual Stereo Pair for ISS-
based Focused Inspection.
Exploits high precision roll angle information.
OTCM Roll Stereo
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21
Light
OTVC
Light
Umbilical
Gripper
Socket Drive
EVA 
Drive 
Bolt
Dextre (also 
called SPDM), 
with OTCM 1 
positioned close 
to the Crew 
Module
OTVC Imaging at 2 
OTCM Rotational 
Positions
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Using One OTVC As a Virtual 
Stereo Pair
• On Dextre (SPDM), the OTVC is offset from the center axis of 
the OTCM.
• Rotating the OTCM both rotates AND translates the associated 
OTVC.
• Assume rotational information for OTCM is high-precision.
• Assume that rotating the OTCM has very little effect on position 
of the OTCM.
• Image surface anomaly from OTVC position 1
• Rotate OTCM
– If necessary, allow any subsequent shaking of Dextre to dampen out
• Image surface anomaly from OTVC position 2.
• Orient the two OTVC images using stereo tools and Dextre 
joint-angle information.
• Produce stereo model of surface anomaly.
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Depth Precision 
vs 
Image Resolution
Sh = (h/B)Sx
Sh = precision of range (depth)
Sx = precision of horizontal position
30 degree rotation ‐> B = 1.29 inches
h Sh / Sx
13” 10.1
16” 12.4
26” 20.2
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Rotational Geometry
16” Range
x’=1.18”
tan(g/2)=y’/(2.5”+x’)
OTCM
x’=1.18”
y’=1.58”
tan(g’/2)=y’/(2.5”‐x’)
OTCM
g=46.47deg
y’=1.58”
g’=100.25deg
2.5” 2.5”
g’ is the maximum rotation angle 
with any image overlap
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OTCM-Roll Photogrammetry
• Basic Sequence:
– OTCM positioned about 16” away from (and “pointing” at) TPS damage cavity.
– OTVC captures an image
– OTCM rolls, moving the OTVC to a different position, separated from the first by 
baseline B (center to center)
– OTVC captures another image.
– Image pair is processed with stereo software for the production of a damage depth 
estimate, and even a 3D characterization of the cavity (probably requires multiple 
pairs, collected from different OTCM look angles)
• Pixel geometry, lens blur, and stereo baseline should support depth 
measurement resolution on the order of 0.1”.  But poor illumination and 
sometimes-bland surface texture can challenge performance.
• Expected resolution degradation due to arm motion should be one to two 
orders of magnitude lower than geometry-related resolution limitations.
• Illumination and bland texture challenges must be dealt with for depth 
measurement resolution to improve from the 0.2” value estimated in 2011 
laboratory analysis (using a related stereo approach).
– Lower depth measurement uncertainty is desirable to lessen the probability of 
unnecessary abandonment of the spacecraft (i.e. “Loss-of-mission”)
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OTVC Imagery:  Tile with Right-cylindrical 
Milled Cavities
• Deep Cavity A (Depth 
TBD)
• Cavity is 2.5” offset 
from roll axis
+24° Roll
1/125th second
Exposure 
0° Roll
1/125th second
Exposure 
-24° Roll
1/125th second
Exposure 
Note:  For this imagery, a 
stand-alone OTVC camera 
(i.e. no robotics) was used, 
but the rolling was applied 
to the test article instead.  
The camera eyepoint was 
positioned 2.5” inches from 
the test article roll axis.
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OTVC Image of Hypervelocity Impact
• Tile damage feature 
that has an entry 
hole in the size 
range of interest, 
with a view to a 
deep “finger”.
• Difficult, but not 
impossible to 
illuminate lower 
portions of cavity 
(emphasized here)
• A piece of paper 
with spots at 
known centers has 
been overlaid on 
the tile to support 
photogrammetric 
truth 
measurements.
• Different exposures 
can be used to 
bracket shadows 
and highlights.
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Recent and Planned Upgrades to Inspection 
Capability Relevant to ISS Visiting Vehicles
• ODAR upgrades to signal quality
– Essentially doubles the vertical resolution in motion video
• HD upgrades to fixed external cameras
• VIPIR – Features additional imagers that could be considered for 
inspection, but is not currently planned for permanent ISS stowage.
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TPS Inspection from SA Cameras
30
Orion Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), with Crew Module (CM – Top) and 
European Service Module (SM – lower, with solar arrays). Cameras and sample 
viewing volumes for a camera-to-array pitch under strong consideration
Camera Line-of-sight Evaluation
(Green Does Not Necessarily Mean Resolution Requirements are Met)
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Camera line-of-sight evaluation 
for 3 different array pitches
Assumes camera-to-array pitch of 
35°
Note:  These results only apply to a very 
wide field-of-view lens setting.  Zooming 
in for good detection resolution will 
constrain coverage and will require 
different array pitches and rolls.
Post EM2 – Deep Space Inspection Idea
• A unique,  robotic Asteroid Retrieval Vehicle (ARV) is sent to a small 
TBD boulder and transfers it to a stable “distant retrograde orbit” 
(DRO) around the Moon.
• An Orion spacecraft, with two crewmembers, is sent to rendezvous 
and dock with the ARV.  
• After docking, several EVAs take place
– Crew members exit the CM through the side hatch door and use a telescoping 
pole to transfer from the CM to the ARV.  The pole will be designed to provide a 
means for the crew members to avoid contacting the CM TPS as they egress.
– Crew members transfer along the ARV to the asteroid capture mechanism and 
then study and determine which samples to bring back within Orion
– Solar array cameras (if implemented) would be used to capture the operation.
• A TPS inspection takes place to determine whether or not the CM 
sustained any damage as part of the operation
– Unclear whether this would involve the solar array cameras, EVA photography, 
or both.
• Other Orion missions with Orion-based EVAs would benefit from TPS 
inspection
32*Basic concept described by Gavin Mendeck (Orion) on 27 May, 2014
